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COGNITION AND VOLITION
Two Aspects of the Human in the Age of Experimental Systems
Benjamin Dawson
If life is meaning and concept, how do we 
conceive of the activity of knowing?
G. Canguilhem
In his major theoretical work on experimentation, Towards a History of 
Epistemic Things (1997), Hans-Jörg Rheinberger writes: ‘If experimen-
tal systems have a life of their own, precisely what kind of life they have 
remains to be determined.’1 Rheinberger is alluding to the slogan Ian 
Hacking gave to the post-Kuhnian ‘practical turn’ in the history and 
epistemology of science.2 Hacking had asserted, in Representing and 
Intervening (1983), that ‘experiments have a life of their own’; they 
mature, evolve, adapt, are not only ‘recycled’ but, ‘quite literally, […] 
retooled’.3 Just as the components of an organism change, while its 
identity remains, so, over time, the components of an experimental set-
up change, yet the experiment subsists. Subsisting through multiple var-
iations, the experiment itself has a life. Rheinberger, however, thinks 
that such determinations of the ‘life’ of an experiment remain, in both 
their form and substance, insufficient. And he intends, with his concept 
of ‘experimental system’, to make good this deficiency. In relation to 
Hacking’s dictum, Rheinberger’s basic gesture seems twofold: his 
approach to the relation between experimental and biological processes 
is oriented towards concrete affinities that would subtend and support 
Hacking’s analogy; while, at the same time, it operates with a more 
‘molecular’, less ‘organic’ (or organism-related) logic of living systems.
 To the extent that the practice of experimentation constitutes a 
‘system’, it has become animated by difference, which in the case of 
experimental systems means the difference – understood dynamically as 
‘reciprocal action’ (Wechselwirkung) – between technical objects or 
instruments, and scientific objects or ‘epistemic things’.4 In Rheinberg-
er’s conception of science, there is a kind of intermittent but (ideally) 
chronic alternation between instrument and object, and an experimental 
system sustains itself so long as it can maintain the difference between 
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them. The system ceases or ‘dies’ when the research object is fully deter-
mined or ‘instrumentalized’ in the sense that it no longer produces the 
surprises that distinguish it from known effects of the instruments. At 
this point the experimental object vanishes, since it no longer resists its 
technological constitution, manipulation, and cognition. When resist-
ance ceases and the object disappears, so too does the system, since the 
system was nothing but the difference of the object with respect to the 
instruments soliciting surprises from it – the difference, in other words, 
between knowledge (qua instruments) and objects (qua material embod-
iments of ‘what one does not yet know’).5 The aspect of experimenta-
tion that interests Rheinberger is the crystallization and localization of 
the unknown in a material form. The epistemic thing is the precarious 
outcome of an operation that, using the instruments of existing knowl-
edge, draws a distinction in ignorance, isolating a known unknown 
from the ocean of unknown unknowns. And what is essential for the 
continuation of this process, for the survival of the system, is the avoid-
ance of any unambiguous or unprovocative confirmation/rejection of 
hypotheses. ‘To remain an experimental system, an experimental 
arrangement must be managed in such a way that it keeps being gov-
erned by difference.’6
 If we widen our perspective, for a moment, from experimental sys-
tems to the modern society in which they emerge and subsist, we can 
see that this management, manipulation, or government by difference, 
characteristic of modern experimental science, is consonant with the 
mode of government that maintains or secures the self-reproduction of 
a variety of functionally differentiated systems across the ‘empire of 
management’ (Legendre) that is modern global society. In his govern-
mentality lectures, Foucault speaks of ‘[a] constant interplay between 
techniques of power and their object’; he unearths that administration 
of difference by difference (the ‘practico-reflexive prism’ as he calls it) 
into which the medieval ‘state of justice’ was transformed or, as he 
famously put it, ‘governmentalized’ in the sixteenth century.7 It was 
then, in the midst of religious and scientific anti-dogmatism (driven and 
guided by the idea of reform), that the modern state emerged as ‘a way 
of doing things’, ‘an active, concerted, reflected practice’.8 Picking up 
Foucault’s intuition that the model of this governmental power was the 
Christian pastorate, Giorgio Agamben has exposed certain theological 
prototypes anticipating this triumph of governance (to the diminish-
ment of sovereignty) in secular society, by retracing those vistas of 
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church history in which the paradigms of modern power/knowledge 
appear to have been preformed.9
 The results help one see something new, both significant and unde-
veloped, in Rheinberger’s vision of science: we see that the scientific 
researcher has been placed under the same ‘minus’ as that special deci-
sion-making agency completely peculiar to Christian/post-Christian 
society – the ‘minister’ (servant).10 When the essence of science becomes 
‘research’, its office is a ministry. We may ask: with respect to what or 
whom is the scientific researcher, tasked with administering experimen-
tal systems, ‘less’? The most obvious answer is that this figure, the sci-
entific executive or functionary, is ‘less’ with respect to the traditional 
transcendent subject of natural philosophy, the infinite intellect of clas-
sical (and still popular) science. Unlike the thinking thing, today’s 
experimental researcher is neither a substance nor a subject but rather a 
performer or, better still, a performance. This non-being and non-sub-
ject, this performance, is immanent to a fully operationalized science, in 
which what is produced is a difference, while that from which this dif-
ference is produced is likewise a difference. An experimental system 
lives as a difference that makes a difference (to redeploy Gregory Bate-
son’s famous definition of information), and the researcher is the one 
who, located entirely within the element of the experimental system, 
manages its emergent effects. ‘Nothing is known – only realized.’ So 
Latour has put it.11 But what is realized, in this sense, has no being – 
which is why the project of developing an ‘object-oriented ontology’ or 
‘speculative realism’ out of Science Studies and Actor Network Theory 
seems misguided. The temporalized components of modern science 
(experimental research) are purely ‘effectual’ (or, if you like, ‘unreal’); 
they constitute a performance that can, within its limits, be reflectively 
regulated, concerted, and maintained.
 Now, it should not escape notice that, if this structural congruence 
with governmental power holds, modern experimental science stands in 
opposition to ‘science’ as tradition has understood/transmitted it. For 
Aristotle, as Agamben elucidates, the paradigm of ‘economic’ relations 
is ‘“administrative” [“gestionale”], and not epistemic’. In other words, 
it is a matter of an activity that is not bound to a system of rules, and does 
not constitute a science in the proper sense. This activity rather implies 
decisions and orders that cope with problems that are each time specific 
and concern the functional order (taxis) of the different parts of the 
oikos.12 
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When, early in his Security lectures, Foucault accidentally referred to 
economy (the Physiocratic doctrine of ‘economic government’) as ‘the 
science of government’, he took pains, the following week, emphatically 
to correct himself, calling this ‘a thoroughly bad and disastrous word’.13 
Henceforth, he would always speak of the art(s) of government. It is in 
the light of the sharp distinction between administration and science 
that the gesture involved in the ‘experimental turn’ in historical episte-
mology may be understood. (For the time being, the question of the real 
history of scientific activity to which such developments in its epistemo-
logical semantics respond and/or enable can be left aside.) ‘Research’, 
which Heidegger rightly saw as ‘the essence of what is today called sci-
ence’, may be grasped as a sublation of the ancient and medieval dis-
tinction between science and administration. This distinction might be 
observed, over a very long durée, from the distinction between epistēmē 
and paideia at the opening of De partibus animalium, through the 
patristic opposition of scientia (a category from which ‘mechanical arts’ 
were strictly excluded) and peritia,14 via the scholastic differentiation 
between cognitio rei and cognitio modi tractandi, to the (increasingly 
fragile) modern analytic separation of truth and know-how (expertise). 
The semantic evolution of this opposition provides the basis, perhaps, 
for a genealogy of ‘research’ as the gradual convergence, accelerating 
since the sixteenth century, of these poles of Western knowledge.15 
While it seemed, for all the world, that certain traditional ‘arts’ (nota-
bly, mechanics) were ‘epistemicized’ at the threshold of scientific moder-
nity, the opposite process – a deconstruction of science, equivalent to its 
‘experimentalization’ – occurs seemingly as part of the same movement. 
When authors as philosophically and historically informed as, say, 
Alexander Koyré and Alfred North Whitehead can offer diametrically 
opposed views of the same ‘scientific revolution’ – the one seeing an 
epistemological rupture with ordinary phenomenal experience in the 
service of abstraction, the other seeing a thoroughly anti-intellectualist 
rejection of the ‘rationalistic orgy’ of the Middle Ages – perhaps the 
task is not to decide which is true, but to find the distinction that annuls 
this alternative in favour of another. These, however, are propositions 
and jobs for a later study.
The first section of this essay sketches part of the theoretical back-
ground of Rheinberger’s determination of the life of an experimental 
system. Two epistemological traditions are highlighted: first, that to 
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which Rheinberger himself professes allegiance, namely, historical epis-
temology and, specifically, the work of Georges Canguilhem; second, 
the differential systems theory associated with Humberto Maturana, 
Heinz von Foerster, and others, of which Rheinberger never makes men-
tion. The purpose of highlighting these epistemological contexts in par-
ticular is to indicate the ‘metabiological’ (and as such post-metaphysi-
cal) foundations of the experimental systems described by Rheinberger. 
A term introduced by Habermas in his controversial reading of Luh-
mannian systems theory, ‘metabiology’ takes the reflexivity and organi-
zational closure of the biological object as its starting point and para-
digm, and develops the conditions of such self-relation/-regulation/ 
-reproduction as the non-ontological, purely operational foundations of 
both observed and observing systems.16 Like the evolutionary biologist 
before the panorama of living systems, the epistemologist of experimen-
tal science (qua historian of epistemic things) observes a ‘universe of 
drifting, merging, and bifurcating systems’.17 The reflexive historical 
epistemologist, Rheinberger notes, is ‘Darwinian’: ‘in his or her realm of 
empirical investigation, [s/he] has to account for contingent events, 
which result in a scattered field of variants that establish their own fil-
tering regime on the basis of their finite possibilities of extension.’ The 
research systems with which he is concerned are characterized, he 
argues, ‘by a kind of differential reproduction by which the generation 
of previously unknown things through unprecedented events becomes 
the reproductive driving force of the whole machinery.’18
 Inasmuch as differential self-reproduction appears, in the era of the 
interpenetration of the discourses of life and information, to have a dis-
tinctively biological derivation,19 experimentation, here, is not so much 
endowed with a ‘life of its own’; more literally, it is reconceived as a 
performance that ‘life’ performs on itself. The moment at which the 
generation of differences becomes the ‘reproductive driving force of the 
whole machinery’ would here coincide with a moment – whose form 
would not be out of place in Schelling – in which ‘life’ takes hold of 
itself as its own epistemic thing. In this sense, then, Rheinberger’s con-
ception of experimental systems might well be described – indeed, on 
this level, more adequately than Luhmann’s sociocybernetics – as ‘meta-
biological’. More important, however, to the larger thesis of this paper 
are the ways in which experimental systems can be seen along these 
lines to exemplify a peculiarly modern mode of cognition: intrinsically 
temporal (rather than situated in an independent external time zone), 
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self-reflexive, differentially reproductive, and operationally closed. The 
notion of the ‘metabiological’ is used, in the service of such a thesis, to 
designate the de-ontologized status of systems that are self-grounded on 
the operational reproduction of internal differences. While not all such 
systems are ‘living’, their operational (non-ontological) status has (not 
coincidentally) lent itself to observation and description using abstrac-
tions or formalizations of biological processes. And, as the later sections 
will indicate, the idea of ‘inner difference’ (which is basic to the pro-
cesses of de-ontologization, operationalization, and temporalization for-
mally characteristic of scientific, societal, and governmental modernity) 
and the idea of ‘life’ (acknowledged, finally, less as a biological concept/
object than as a metabiological policy) were parties of an engagement 
that long preceded the marriage of cybernetics and biology in the mid-
twentieth century.
 In pursuit of this longer-durée genealogy, Section II seeks to elon-
gate the modernity within which such systems operate by returning to 
Kant. For it is the irreducibly temporal and differential character of the 
self-consciousness at the centre of Kant’s theoretical philosophy that 
first announces the modern epistemological condition. This reading of 
Kant is obviously partial, and is intended primarily to enable the 
attempt, introduced in this section, to think that which is ‘outside’ and 
constitutively absent from the temporal, differential form of cognitive 
systems (including, exemplarily, experimental systems) in modernity. 
This ‘other scene’ of scientific and societal modernity will, after Kant, 
be called ‘pure practical reason’ or ‘will’. With this antinomy, the essay 
endeavours to indicate the ground upon which, in the wake of late 
twentieth-century developments in historical epistemology and systems 
theory, as well as the genealogy of governmental power, a new specula-
tive anthropology may be posited. 
 The thesis is that modernity is an age of voluntary and involuntary 
humanity, an age of ‘anthropolarity’. This proposition is speculative, 
since while pure practical reason (resting at one pole) would be the un-
experiential underside of cognition in modernity, from within the mod-
ern episteme it is possible neither to determine the concrete historical 
becoming of this polarity nor to construct potential mediations of the 
relationship. Certainly, one can suppose the existence of any number of 
social conditions for such an emergence of involuntary humanity. Yet an 
impenetrable, ahistorical dimension of this divergence seems signalled 
by the remarkable consistency with which the basic idea of an essen-
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tially autonomous practical reason has been described by the tradition 
of political voluntarism that has accompanied or shadowed, step-by-
step, the evolution of a scientific and societal modernity within which 
volition has precisely no function, no effect, no power whatsoever. Per-
haps, though, (and this is the thought pursued here) it is its very 
unchangeability that places practical reason simultaneously inside and 
outside modernity, as if it were caught in a process that purifies it in the 
same measure as it is deactivated, rendering it more timelessly universal 
as it is less effective, and making it disappear from actuality in the same 
measure as it coincides with it.
 Equally paradoxical is the function of distinction, here, which itself 
stands on one side of the core distinction (volition/distinction) towards 
which the essay tends: a distinction of distinction and, further, the posi-
tive specification of that from which ‘distinction’ as such is distin-
guished – these are the moves essayed here. Volition is posited as the 
substance that not only remains undestroyed in the present, but that is, 
furthermore, in a bipolar relationship with any and every experimental 
(or other differential, involuntary, cognitive) system. Humanity is will 
and cognition, and the claim made here is that modernity has the struc-
ture of an unmediated alternative between these two aspects, rendering 
anthropos comparable, in certain ways, to a multistable figure. Bistable 
figures – such as the famous duck-rabbit drawing which so intrigued 
Wittgenstein – offer visual metaphors for a kind of emaciated dialectic 
in which two poles interpenetrate so completely, and without remain-
der, that they seem not to touch, not to have any contact with each 
other. Mediation is figured in the impoverished form of the mere flip-
ping of aspects, and is itself split and isolated at the extremes – in our 
case: distinction and volition as the incommensurably coinciding sites of 
anthropos today. This comparison suggests, of course, the possibility of 
something akin to an aspect-shift in which the lineaments of the insub-
stantial actuality from which pure practical reason is constitutively 
absent would be re-cognized as the lineaments of that very substance. 
The apparent paradox, here, is that this re-cognition of will could hap-
pen only at the point at which cognition is grasped as an entirely invol-
untary process. In this respect, Rheinbergian experimental systems seem 
promising sites of inquiry, since they outline the alienated mind in an 
extreme form – the cognitive process once called ‘science’ diminished, 
now, to a ‘world of research’ that persists as the material self-reproduc-
tion and recursive performance of distinctions.
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I .  T H E  B I O L O G I C A L  D I A L E C T I C
It is also in this sense that the contemporary biologist speaks of writing 
and pro-gram in relation to the most elementary processes of information 
within the living cell. And, finally, whether it has essential limits or not, the 
entire field covered by the cybernetic program will be the field of writing. 
If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical concepts – 
including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of memory – 
which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must con-
serve the notion of writing, trace, grammè [written mark], or grapheme, 
until its own historico-metaphysical character is also exposed.20
The immediate background to Rheinberger’s theory is the entanglement 
between biology and epistemology in the mid-twentieth century. There 
are two important sites at which this entanglement may be observed, 
both of which exert an influence on the theory of experimental systems, 
even while both were themselves conditioned by the actual existence of 
such systems. One is the biological twist given, in the thought of 
Georges Canguilhem, to the ‘philosophy of the concept’ (a tradition in 
France associated with the work of Gaston Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, 
and others).21 The other is the different yet comparable series of con-
structions of the relationship between cognitive and living systems in 
the articles of the Macy group, and, subsequently, the Biological Com-
puter Laboratory of Heinz von Foerster.22 
 In an article of 1966 entitled ‘Le Concept et la vie’, Canguilhem 
clarified one of the fundamental gestures of his thought. Epistemic pro-
duction – the practice of concept formation known in the modern age 
as scientific research – is not, Canguilhem suggests, the activity of a dis-
embodied cogito traversing the world in ‘the lightning flash of an infi-
nite understanding’ (Foucault’s contemporary description of the episte-
mological subject of the ‘Classical age’); rather, it is that of a living 
being. If intelligence is ‘de-Platonized’ and given a place among the 
forms of nature, then, Canguilhem writes, ‘science, and in particular the 
science of life, is an activity of life itself.’23 The particularity of biosci-
ence is that it is, as such, life’s knowledge of itself. In ‘Le Concept et la 
vie’, therefore, the genitive in the syntagma ‘science of life’, first pro-
posed by John Brown in his Elements of Medicine of 1795, becomes a 
double genitive: life is both the object and, at bottom, the subject of 
bioscientific research. We could say that, from Canguilhem’s (Aristote-
lian) perspective, the scientific orientation toward the world is one of 
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those ‘states’ referred to by Thomas Beddoes in his definition of ‘biol-
ogy’ as ‘the doctrine of the living system in all its states’.24
 During the same years as Canguilhem was developing his ‘biol-
ogized’ epistemology, on the other side of the Atlantic, complementary 
machinations between cognition and life were advancing in cybernetics. 
Here, computers were beginning to materialize, in the reflexivity and 
recursivity of their operational structure, aspects of the organization of 
living systems. And, side by side, biologists such as Humberto Matu-
rana were reflecting, epistemologically, upon the embodiment of cogni-
tion, introducing the biologist into biology, and observing themselves as 
observing systems. The abstraction/appropriation of living machines 
into epistemologies was coupled to the materialization/externalization 
of such cognitive models as computers.25 A biology inclusive, from the 
outset, of the biology of cognition, and an epistemology formalizing 
itself out of the problems and paradoxes encountered in such biology 
were tending toward the single paradigm, beyond the residues of ontol-
ogy in concepts of self-generation and self-organization, of purely oper-
ational epigenesis and differential self-reproduction (autopoiesis). 
 In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard seems to register the feed-
back loops or reciprocal exchanges taking place in those years when he 
observes, first, that genetics ‘owes its theoretical paradigm to cybernet-
ics’, and, later in his report, that cybernetics had expanded the theory of 
the self-regulating system beyond the functionalist form of the organ-
ism.26 Biology learns from cybernetics, which learns from biology. The 
medium of this dialectic between living and cognitive systems was, of 
course, the vocabulary of linguistics and the discourse of ‘information’ 
that had increasingly penetrated biological science from the time of the 
discovery of the double helix. As Canguilhem summarized, by the mid 
1960s, ‘[m]essages, information, programs, code, instructions, decod-
ing’ and so on had become ‘the new concepts of the life sciences’.27 As 
biological science was appropriating the conceptual terminology of 
communication, epistemology – in the form of second-order cybernetics 
– was drawing upon the form of living self-organization in order further 
to unmoor itself from metaphysical foundations, to ‘operationalize’ 
itself. A mutation of the metaphysical foundations of science was taking 
place which would ultimately dispense with such foundations; this sci-
ence was not so much disenchanting as ‘de-ontologizing’ the world.28 
 Similarly, Canguilhem’s basic gesture shifted ‘the concept’ – the for-
mal, impersonal element of science in its discontinuous history – from 
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its mathematico-metaphysical foundations (a Platonism extending 
through the philosophies of Bachelard, Koyré, and Cavaillès) onto a 
‘metabiological’ ground whose primary philosophical expression was to 
be found in Aristotle. ‘Metabiological’: the concept, here, is folded into 
life but is not simply or exactly in itself ‘alive’; it is a question, rather, of 
the paradoxical location of ‘order’ or ‘form’ within the order of forms, 
and, unfolding from this, of a logos entangled with the living, insepara-
ble, ultimately, from its actualization in the logic of the living. 
If the a priori is in things, if the concept is in life, then to be a subject of 
knowledge is simply to be dissatisfied with the meaning one finds ready at 
hand.29 
This de-foundation or deconstruction of the concept, re-grounding it in 
life, ought to be placed alongside the dialectical movement (sketched 
above) through which the theory of differential systems evolved, in the 
middle of the twentieth century, both from and as the experimental cog-
nition of living systems. Each was the site of the same interleaving 
between the ‘systems’ of bios and logos. Together, the biologized episte-
mology extending from Canguilhem, and the epistemologized biology 
extending from the Macy group constitute the semantic space within 
which the self-reflection/self-description of experimental science 
advances in work such as Rheinberger’s. For this mid twentieth-century 
tendency, it was as if mind and life had been subject to some originary 
bifurcation, a fall, which, only now that their languages had rediscov-
ered one another, was to be sutured.30 The ensuing structural coupling 
between biological systems and metabiological (cognitive) systems 
might not have an end. If Novalis’s millenarian version is believed, we 
may be stuck with this disaster: 
Here that living reflection comes into being, which with careful tending 
afterwards extends itself into an infinitely formed spiritual universe – the 
kernel or germ of an all-encompassing organization [alles befassenden 
Organisation]. It is the beginning of a true self-penetration of the spirit 
[Selbstdurchdringung des Geistes] which never ends.31
 
Such a self-penetration of the spirit seems concretely to take place in the 
emergence of experimental systems (once again, treated here as paradig-
matic for a variety of metabiologically founded systems). And, it might 
be said that, deepening the subversion of representational thought (or 
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‘picture thinking’) in post-Kuhnian historical philosophies of science, 
Rheinberger’s historical epistemology gives both the deconstructivist 
variant of the philosophy of the concept and, less explicitly, the parallel 
constructivist theory of differential systems (second-order cybernetics) 
an axial rotation toward the ‘object’.32 While post-structuralism, radical 
constructivism, autopoiesis theory, and other styles of second-order 
observation have tended to assert their post-metaphysical character by 
carefully bracketing ‘objectivity’ (shifting ‘from being to doing’ as Mat-
urana puts it), Rheinberger’s rediscovery of différance in the lab 
embeds, and in a sense re-materializes, the form of a purely operational 
system of differential self-reproduction in experimental set-ups contain-
ing organic materials. Moreover, driven perhaps by the same ‘abhor-
rence of abstraction’ that is the hallmark of biologists (according to a 
quotation from François Jacob that Rheinberger uses as a chapter epi-
graph), his deconstruction of bioscience seems, at times, to shade into a 
kind of philosophy of living nature, in which ‘life’ would be determined, 
beyond all representationalism, as a material–conceptual process of dif-
ferential reproduction through (or as) continuous auto-experimentation. 
Reading Rheinberger, one has the impression (often, yet in a manner 
that isn’t easy to isolate with precision) that the ‘life’ of experimental 
systems is not ultimately distinguishable from the ‘life’ of their biologi-
cal objects of study.33 These systems are ‘governed by difference’ (and 
are managed in such a way as to remain so), and the differences govern-
ing them arise from the errant (auto-deconstructivist) behaviour of liv-
ing bits of unknown knowledge, as they continuously derange or defer 
containment by the mutable assemblages of technical objects surround-
ing and soliciting them. Rather as Marx’s materialist science pivots on 
the discovery and analysis of the commodity-form as both the condition 
and result of capitalist production, Rheinberger’s historical epistemol-
ogy hinges on the internally differential character of the epistemic thing, 
concretely flickering between representation and reality, as both the pre-
requisite motive and the resulting product of the experimental machine.
Scientific objects have the precarious status of being absent in their experi-
mental presence […]. A mixture of hard and soft, like Serres’s veils, they 
are ‘object, still, sign, already; sign, still, object, already.’ […] Experimental 
conditions ‘contain’ the scientific objects in the double sense of this expres-
sion: they embed them, and through that very embracement, they restrict 
and constrain them.34
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Objective knowledge is constructed. But, moving beyond the first-Kritik 
Kantianism of that recognition, such knowledge refers to things whose 
epistemic potentiality is not exhausted in the constructions they excite, 
since every construction (at least those that are experimental rather than 
definitive) distinguish what is known from the material unknown of 
that knowledge. Epistemic things manifest the difference between indi-
cation and generation – that is, the essential tension of every construc-
tivism – but as a real difference, a tension between signification and 
existence at work in the real.
 While radical constructivism, cybernetic epistemologies, and theo-
ries of second-order observation have sought to generalize and formal-
ize the reflexivity explicit in the knowledge of life, Rheinberger’s 
thought moves in the other direction. In line with a basic insight which, 
reaching back to Kant, emphasizes the reflective character of functional 
explanation and of the cognition of self-organization, the essentially 
reflective form of theory construction characteristic of paradox-embrac-
ing, second-order theories like that of ‘autopoiesis’ renders the attribu-
tion, to the systems they describe, of attributes such as self-reference, 
internal difference, recursive functioning, organizational closure, and 
the like, radically non-equivalent with the ordinary intellectual attribu-
tion of predicates to objects (i.e. what Kant had called constitutive or 
determinate judgment). Rheinberger, however, in contrast with cyber-
neticians working further to abstract and generalize these systems theo-
ries, transposes or (as he might prefer) ‘regrafts’ this de-ontologizing 
reflexivity (back) onto the ‘real’.35 In a kind of inverted constructivism, 
which is subtracted from traditional oppositions of the material and the 
mental, the vital differences he calls epistemic things become the engine 
of research machines. ‘“Differantial” reproduction in the sense of a per-
manent dislocation of epistemic entities is precisely what endows a 
research system with its generative power, and what renders the process 
genuinely historial.’36 As such statements reveal, Rheinberger’s thought 
is – at last – less a ‘re-ontologization’ of post-metaphysical discourses as 
it is an advance, into the bracketed domain of things in themselves, of 
an operationalization of the world. It is consistent, in other words, with 
an epistemological shift from substance to function which has been 
accelerating – at least in self-consciousness – since the 1950s.
 Now, Rheinberger’s transposition of constructivism/deconstruction 
onto experimental bioscience takes place, decisively, under the influence 
of Canguilhem, insofar as the programme of his epistemology is con-
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densed in the early formulation: ‘transposing the dialectical process of 
thought onto the real, one can maintain that it is life, the object of study 
itself, that is the dialectical essence, whose structure thought must 
espouse [la pensée doit en épouser la structure]’.37 Surveying the contra-
dictions within which biological thought has seemingly always moved, 
and re-projecting this dialectic onto the object of study itself, Canguil-
hem isolates and suspends a zone of material reality (i.e. that which is 
‘self-preserving by means of self-regulation’38) between multiple intellec-
tual determinations (e.g. mechanism vs. purpose, atomism vs. totality, 
continuity vs. discontinuity) in a manner that renders ‘life’ the dialecti-
cal essence of science, the concept itself, or a kind of biological impera-
tive given to science. For the present essay, it is important to hold onto 
this ‘must’: why must thought espouse the structure of life? One is 
reminded, here, of the Luhmannian advice: rather than ‘search for the 
egg from which it emerged, the chicken should lay another and 
cackle’.39 Is this ‘should’, relating to reproduction, the bare metabiologi-
cal norm, which remains beyond a certain modern liquidation of 
norms?
 Either way, in light of the theoretical developments in biology since 
the mid twentieth century, the attribution of ‘life’ to an experimental 
system (on the basis of its differentially self-reproductive form) can no 
longer be interpreted as simply or stably metaphorical: it is not exactly 
a metaphor, since the vehicle of the metaphor, biological life, is itself 
defined in more or less the same terms as the metaphor’s apparent 
tenor, experimental systems. To repeat: insofar as the form of ‘life’ of an 
experimental system is this errant self-repetition, the autopoiesis or reit-
eration of a difference, the system ceases to be merely metaphorically 
‘alive’, since this characterization tendentially approximates the regula-
tive principle or ‘project’ of the errant or mutating self-copyists of 
study, actual biological systems. ‘Evolution is built on accidents, on 
chance events, on errors’, writes François Jacob, in a sentence that 
might easily have come from Rheinberger’s description of scientific evo-
lution, and continues: ‘The very thing that would lead an inert system 
to destruction becomes a source of novelty and complexity in a living 
system.’40 By like token, experimental results that seem merely destruc-
tive for science (when self-construed as an essentially theoretical enter-
prise) are a source of surprise and potential regeneration for experimen-
tal systems. Since the particular experimental systems to which Rhein-
berger is referring are (in the first instance) precisely those of 
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mid-twentieth-century molecular biology, from a higher standpoint, the 
regulative differential principle of the experiment as a system can be 
seen to coincide with the regulative differential principle of the living 
objects studied within it. And, crucially, in both cases:
 
There is no Mind to direct operations, no Will to order them to continue 
or stop. There is only the perpetual execution of a programme that cannot 
be dissociated from its fulfilment. […] There is no longer a cause for repro-
duction, simply a cycle of events in which the role of each constituent is 
dependent on the others.41
From a perspective cognizant of the coupling of epistemology and biol-
ogy in the twentieth century, it would seem that the model of the exper-
imental system developed by Rheinberger is abstracted, via the interme-
diary of certain post-metaphysical theories, from the very self-reproduc-
ing differential systems discovered/invented within these experimental 
systems. From this standpoint, then, the distinction between cognitive 
and living systems begins to recede, making way for the thought of that 
which is distinct from both.
 These elementary notes concerning the doublings and re-doublings 
of cybernetics, post-structuralism, and biology in the second half of the 
twentieth century indicate only the most obvious way in which the met-
abiological ‘life’ of experimentation, which is (implicitly) de-meta-
phorized in the shift between Hacking and Rheinberger, might be fur-
ther determined. Yet such a historicization, while certainly to be 
desired, would remain insufficient. For it is a significant premise of this 
essay that the dialectical conjunction of the concept and life runs deeper 
than any twentieth-century machinations. 
I I .  I N N E R  D I F F E R E N C E  A N D  I N V O L U N T A R Y  S C I E N C E
Habermas’s provocative suggestion that Luhmannian systems theory 
appropriates the very philosophy of the subject it rejects as ‘Old Euro-
pean’ points to a particular – potentially very precious – connection 
between metabiologically founded systems and the ‘self-consciousness’ 
described in the German philosophical tradition extending from Kant to 
Hegel.42 At the same time, Habermas’s reading of Luhmann seems to 
underestimate the shift, at the core of the Luhmannian gesture in the-
ory, from the metaphysical paradigm of the subject to the post-meta-
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physical paradigm of performance. Then again, if the Critical philoso-
phy was itself a break with metaphysics, the constructivist and decon-
structive descriptions of biological, social, and experimental systems 
that have emerged and developed since the 1950s may represent a con-
tinuation, rather than either a break or ‘appropriation’, of the transcen-
dental philosophy of self-consciousness.
 Taking up an interpretation offered by Foucault, Deleuze, and, 
more recently, Béatrice Longuenesse and Peter Osborne, one can lay 
stress on how Kant forecloses the possibility of direct self-cognition. As 
Longuenesse puts it, Kant’s Copernican turn is ‘an internalization 
within thought of the relation between matter and form’. For Kant, 
‘“matter” and “form” characterize the two poles of the activity of rep-
resentation: the given (“determinable”) and the act of combining this 
given (“determination”)’. The distinction is now a polarity, that is, a 
relation that Kant has ‘internalize[d]’, relocating it from ‘being’ to ‘the 
activity of thinking’.43 The interpretation of this interiorization offered 
by Foucault (‘The Analytic of Finitude’) placed Kant at the threshold of 
the modern episteme and, on the platform of the transcendental philos-
ophy, drew a series of anthropo-centring connections between differ-
ence, life, historicity, and cognition. In Foucault’s as in Deleuze’s read-
ing of Kant, the de-ontologizing (or operationalizing) re-entry of the 
logical dichotomy (form/matter) into the activity of thinking coincides 
with the insertion of that activity (thought) into time. The Kantian self-
consciousness, so the interpretation runs, is the first finite (or ‘secular’) 
form of subjectivity. Kant’s rigorous denial of Cartesian self-cognition is 
premised on the fundamentally temporal relation between determina-
tion (form) and the undetermined (matter), or between ‘I think’ and ‘I 
am’. Deleuze writes: 
To ‘I think’ and ‘I am’ must be added the self – that is, the passive position 
(what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the 
undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time. 
Nor is ‘add’ entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of 
establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought.44 
Whereas the Classical subject (as ‘thinking substance’) was capable of 
immediate self-determination, Kantian self-consciousness takes time. 
The interiorization of form/matter renders the problem of a post-Kan-
tian or modern philosophy the problem of the relation between facul-
ties. Time, for Kant, is not only a form of intuition; it also foregrounds, 
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for the first time, the medium of the process of determining the undeter-
mined. In addition to being a pure form of intuition, time becomes, as 
Deleuze puts it, a ‘third logical value’ separating and relating form and 
matter.45 This interpretation of the decisive significance of Kant’s gesture 
in philosophy hangs on a footnote to the B-Deduction in which Kant 
defines time, not as a pure form of intuition, but as ‘the receptivity of 
the determinable [Rezeptivität des Bestimmbaren]’.46 In Kant’s philoso-
phy, undetermined existence (or ‘matter’) requires something in order to 
be determined: it requires the receptivity or determinability of the deter-
minable. This is Kant’s ‘discovery of the transcendental’, his ‘discovery 
of Difference’; the footnote lays bare ‘the fracture of the I’ and the ‘pas-
sivity of the self’, which is to say, the emergence of ‘inner difference’.47 
As the ‘receptivity of the determinable’, the temporal, finite self is an 
inner difference between determination and the undetermined, a ‘polar-
ity’ in Longuenesse’s (and Schelling’s, Novalis’s, Ritter’s …) terms.
 What has this to do with the metabiological, with experimental 
systems, with a science, a society, a form of power, and a subjectivity 
that have all, so to speak, gone into administration?
 Well, the entire conception of an operational system, a system that 
has no ontology, since its actions (differences) are not grounded in a 
substance but rather in other actions (differences), evidently depends on 
the notion of such a system’s intrinsic temporality, as opposed to any 
location in space and time.
[E]very system of material entities, and therefore every system of actions 
concerning such entities that can be said to possess reproductive qualities, 
may also be said to possess its own intrinsic time. […] Internal time char-
acterizes a sequence of states of a system insofar as it undergoes continuing 
cycles of nonidentical reproduction.48 
The complete identification of ‘being’ and ‘operation’ that is transcribed 
here applies equally to biological and metabiological systems. In Jacob’s 
Logique du vivant, we read: ‘Inanimate bodies do not depend on time. 
Living bodies are indissolubly bound up with time. In the living world, 
no structure can be detached from its history.’49 
 The shift from a Cartesian cogito to a Kantian self-consciousness, a 
shift involving a certain ‘doubling’ of time, is situated at the threshold 
of an age to which, however precariously, the systems observed by 
Jacob and Rheinberger belong. Within such an economy, as Julian Rob-
erts puts it, ‘rationality is essentially temporal’; ‘“truth” is something 
 
 C O G N I T I O N  A N D  V O L I T I O N 129
inescapably sequential; and “reference” is not so much to something 
outside, as to the outside of boundaries produced within thought 
itself.’50 This temporalization of cognition, conjoined to a ‘diminution’ 
of the subject of knowledge and to the irreversible emergence of the 
boundary-producing character of the activity of knowing, is the arché 
of experimental systems and their epistemic things, governmental sys-
tems and their crises, and, ultimately perhaps, of the differential form of 
modernity’s global-societal communication system. Such systems consist 
of performances that serve the differential arrangement of their appara-
tuses by sustaining the difference that governs them. Already with Kant, 
the conditions for this situation are in place: the subject of science, the 
‘agency’ of cognition, is a transcendental difference, not a substance. 
Substantial subjectivity, in Kant, characterizes only the practical subject. 
And it is therefore no accident that Deleuze complains of Kant that he 
‘did not pursue his initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical 
resurrection.’ That is, for Deleuze, Kant’s conception of practical reason 
remains unsecularized in its ‘substantial’ determination.51
 Unsurprisingly, then, it is with reference to the famous ‘great gulf’ 
separating theoretical and practical reason that a preliminary line draw-
ing of ‘anthropolarity’ may be attempted. In this drawing of a bipolar 
or bistable figure, the substantially wilful human being interpenetrates-
without-touching an involuntary operation of differential reproduc-
tion.52 A concept reduced to life, a science operating as pure research, a 
subject bounded to the reflexive establishment, expansive interioriza-
tion, and ceaseless reiteration of difference – this aspect is so dominant 
as to have made its other unobservable.
 In experimental systems, if not in modern social systems generally, 
rationality becomes ‘the ensemble of the conditions that make system 
maintenance possible’.53 This formulation, which registers Habermas’s 
appreciable distress at a ‘despairing rationalism without reason’ (Gillian 
Rose), almost exactly mirrors that with which, on the threshold of our 
episteme, Bichat famously defined life, ‘the ensemble of functions that 
resist death [l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort]’. Metabio-
logical systems are, in this light, descendants of a critical vitalism that 
emerged precisely via the separation of ‘life’ from ‘volition’, a division 
of the living soul as it was still theorized, for instance, by Stahl. Since it 
identified life (contra mechanism) directly with the purposive reason of 
the soul, Stahlian animism could never be convicted of irrationalism in 
the way that modern vitalism has been. While the tasks of this essay are 
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not properly historical, one may note that, prior to the Kantian formu-
lation of the central antinomies of bourgeois thought, the development 
of neurology and physiology had proceeded, since Thomas Willis’s par-
adigm-changing work on the nerves, as an increasing separation of the 
higher rational faculties from, in Robert Whytt’s terms, ‘the vital and 
other involuntary motions of animals’, that is, the reflexes. It is from 
the latter, from a radically will-divested vitality, that the metabiological 
ratio of modernity will abstract and formalize itself. Such a rationality 
without reason will be immanent to a form of order that is, as Hume 
beautifully put it, spun, like a spider’s web, from the belly not from the 
brain.54
 In a dialectical history that has never fully been told, as practical 
reason (volition) was separated from the operations of thought, ration-
ality was naturalized, inserted into the immanence of life, where it thus 
became an intrinsically temporal, effectual, insubstantial, and (from the 
standpoint of its increasingly impotent and exposed substance) irra-
tional logic of differential reproduction or system maintenance. This 
history of the de-voluntarization of life coupled to the metabiologiza-
tion of reason is unfinished; it continues, today, in the management of 
experimental systems and in the functional performance of administra-
tion (oikonomia) at diverse sites of the modern global Inspection 
House, the house of experiment or ‘Elaboratory’ (Jeremy Bentham). If 
this practice isn’t a science, as Agamben and Foucault have stressed, still 
less is it formative activity (transcendent work). It is rather a form of 
immanent drudgery, a drudgery divine, which, like the unwinnable bat-
tle against the dust described by de Beauvoir, is aimed at reproducing an 
actuality whose transience makes its upkeep unceasing: purposive with-
out a purpose.
I I I .  T H E  B I O L O G I C A L  I M P E R A T I V E  A N D  A B S O L U T E 
I M P O T E N C E
‘Multipliez, multipliez: vous finirez bien par croître, comme espèce et 
comme individus.’55 With these words a ‘wholly New Testament of biol-
ogy’ is announced – the new age of differential reproduction that Fou-
cault (as also Canguilhem) discerned in François Jacob.56 It was essen-
tially the same good news that, qua the paradigm of ‘autopoiesis’, was 
concurrently enabling what Luhmann would call ‘sociological enlight-
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enment’. System: difference. In modernity, multiplication, reproduction, 
or self-division is not a secondary, more-or-less subordinate property of 
nature and society. On the contrary, rather as exchange value comes to 
precede and outrank utility in the production of commodities, so, in 
biological, experimental, and governmental systems, difference comes to 
precede individuation itself. Reproduction is not, so to speak, the com-
pensation that living beings receive for their incapacity to continue 
growing eternally; the aleatory differentiation of reproduction traverses 
biological systems (as also metabiological systems) all the way down. 
 Perhaps Foucault was right to locate a shift going on around him, a 
shift in the foundations of biology from the primacy of growth/individ-
uation to a conception of pure differentiation; and perhaps, too, the 
new paradigm enabled him to see something in the history of power 
absent from his earlier researches. Insofar as disciplinary apparatuses 
aim, precisely, ‘to increase and multiply’ the productive powers of the 
body, it would seem that his development of the subtly contrasting con-
cept of governmental power (whose essential interest is not in produc-
tion and growth but rather reproduction and security) contains decisive 
echoes of the ‘New Testament’ of biology.57 Government, as he begins 
to theorize it in the mid-1970s, in contra-distinction to disciplinary 
power, does not fundamentally aim to increase anything, but only to 
reproduce the difference, the correlation, the interplay between tech-
niques of power and their object. This is why it is so appropriate and 
revealing that Rheinberger, in the sentence around which this essay has 
circled, identifies the existence of the experimental system with its 
capacity to ‘keep being governed by difference’. At the same time, the 
notion that Foucault’s development of the concept of governmentality 
was in some sense enabled by his reading of the new biology opens a 
complex question about the relation between the genealogy of govern-
ment and the epistemology of biology. For it suggests that twentieth-
century machinations in the latter (sketched in Section I above) pro-
vided thinkers like Foucault and Luhmann with the conceptual instru-
ments with which to perceive a somehow comparable ‘paradigm shift’ 
in society itself at the onset of modernity. In a still slightly mysterious 
typology or historical index, the archaeological breaks of the Sattelzeit 
seem not to have become properly legible until the biological, epistemo-
logical, and sociological ‘enlightenments’ beginning c. 1950.
 If, as Foucault put it, the threshold of modernity is biological, it is 
because cognition in general, in this regime, is an inner difference, while 
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inner difference is, will be, and will have been the simple essence of 
life.58 Whether in the structure of power or the practice of experiment, 
the ground of modernity is division, distinction, difference: no longer 
the difference between two positive terms, but difference itself, imma-
nent difference, ‘life’: 
This simple infinity, or the absolute concept, may be called the simple 
essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipres-
ence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is 
itself every difference as also their supersession [selbst alle Unterschiede ist, 
so wie ihr Aufgehobensein]; it pulsates within itself but does not move, 
inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest.59
One should not be deceived by the mystical language here – which is, in 
any case, already highly self-conscious – into assuming that Hegel 
speaks from some earlier and other ‘world we have lost’. This ‘mystical’ 
foundation of reality is ours, inescapably according to Novalis’s proph-
esy. By like token, the fact that, as Hegel highlights, the absolute con-
cept ‘may be called’ by different names (infinity, life, world-soul, univer-
sal blood, etc., to which list, after Marx, one can add capital) should 
not deceive us into thinking that ‘life’ is merely one (modern) philo-
sophical nomination of this inner difference, as some have suggested.60 
‘Life’, in this episteme, is neither a pure concept of the understanding, 
nor an empirical concept under which a specific intuition can be 
brought. It is, on the contrary, part of the apparatus, the temporal self-
affecting process of cognition. Life is not only ‘more-life’, but also 
‘more-than-life’ – biologically multiplying and metabiologically interior-
izing.61 Thus, at least in modernity, the ‘naming of being’, as the appar-
ently primary gesture of theory construction, is already captured by dif-
ference, is already a distinction; nothing happens without a distinc-
tion.62 Schmitt reacts against modernity when he maintains that divisio 
is not primaeva, that division (distribution) is preceded by a taking 
(appropriation, Nehmen).63 For our age, the opposite is closer to the 
truth: ‘taking’ presupposes (and enacts) division. By the same token, the 
basic desire to strip power of its power can no longer coordinate a 
meaningful political project, as it has done for so long, and as the young 
Hegel still thought it could.64 A power stripped of its form as power, 
and a science stripped of its form as science, constitute today precisely 
the normal situation of normal change. The historico-transcendental 
condition of this order may be discerned in the Copernican revolution 
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in philosophy, and its introduction of time (the receptivity of the deter-
minable) into being and thought. Agamben is alive to this significance 
of time when he presents, through a simultaneous reading of Paul with 
Benjamin, the Messiah as a division of time’s division.65 And time’s divi-
sion is not merely past and future, but is rather the immanent differ-
ence, the receptivity of the determinable, subtending all positive differ-
ences. Then again, time (as inner difference) may itself be founded on 
life’s injunction, a biological imperative. In modernity, in the time-zone 
already inhabited by Kantian thought, cognition (including scientific 
cognition) has been penetrated by the mode of receptivity and self-activ-
ity which has no other name but ‘life’. The concept receives its law, as 
an injunction to distinguish, from here.
 Empirical cognition’s origin in a biological imperative to keep 
being governed by difference may be placed alongside the categorical 
imperative with which it is strictly contemporary.66 Life, as the structure 
of differentiation or dialectical process that thought must espouse, is the 
metabiological para-imperative of the age of anthropolarity. In their de-
ontologized performances, the differential systems described by Rhein-
berger are, if they wish to occur and recur, subjected to this injunction. 
The purpose of making such connections is not merely to underline 
once more that Kant’s thought crosses the threshold of a modernity in 
which we remain, but, further, to point, from these later incarnations of 
‘inner difference’, back to the subjectivity from which they have been 
subtracted. This latter may still be called by its Kantian names, ‘pure 
practical reason’ or ‘will’ (Wille), so long as it is acknowledged that, in 
calling it as much, one recognizes not a power but an impotence. If, as 
Deleuze begins to contend, Kant is the first to present cognition as 
insubstantial (non-theological) effectuality (i.e. as an economy), his sys-
tem also contains the clearest formulation of the cognitive ‘outside’, a 
substance absolutely incapable of effects: pure practical reason, or will. 
 Even if this essay can do no more than point to this aspect, indeed 
barely so much, this modern impotence, this voluntary human being – 
or human nothing – must on some level exist. Here, the distinction 
between volition and the power of choice (Wille and Willkür) needs 
again to be reinforced. For there are, of course, multiple displays of 
agency and decision-making at the ministerial level; indeed, these non-
rule-following selections are the essential operations of the performance 
of governmental and experimental systems. Without them, everything 
stops. But these are, one and all, the basically arbitrary operations of a 
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morally, rationally, and ontologically ungrounded power of choice. And 
between the timeless impotence of pure practical reason and the real-
time empire of decisions and distinctions, there can be no difference of 
degree. The ‘minus’ of ‘ministry’ is not a quantitative lessness of power 
or being; it is less than power or being. The Son is not less substance 
than the Father; as substance, the three persons are one (monotheism); 
yet, God is not only substance, but also an effective activity, or, to use 
the technical term, an economy. When our world became Christian, or 
rather when it became (so to speak) seemingly unstoppably auto-Chris-
tianizing, a split was introduced between being and practice which 
modernity, in both its governmental form of ‘power’ and its experimen-
tal form of ‘science’, has not ceased to radicalize. Today, this world can 
be presented as a polarity without a field of tension or space of media-
tion between the will – the sole reigning and remaining substance – and 
the multiverse of ‘drifting, merging, and bifurcating systems’.
 In Agamben’s speculative genealogy, the theological and the oiko-
nomic, substance and effectuality, form a bipolar ‘machine’ in which 
neither is possible without the other – so that, even in a situation such 
as ours in which all power has taken the form of an economy, the radi-
cally emptied substance of a useless, exclusively pompous sovereignty 
(on show for instance in the recent wedding of the second-in-line to the 
British crown) not only remains, but remains indispensable, structurally, 
to the functioning of the machine. If we uphold the thesis of this polar-
ity, then the differential-metabiological-oikonomic ‘life’ of experimental 
systems implies the persistence of an annulled and emptied transcend-
ence. The proposition, here, is that this ineffectual substance has not 
only a religious and a constitutional designation (i.e. Father and King, 
respectively), but also an anthropological value as voluntary humanity. 
Volition absently remains; it is even, perhaps, all that remains. It 
remains, however, unobserved, while, on the face of things, the human 
appears gradually more involuntary, gradually less distinguishable from 
the performance of recursive distinguishing, from the careful manage-
ment of apparatuses so that they, and therefore it, keep being governed 
by difference. The problem is how to conceive the relation of the two 
(volition/distinction). When an opposition between two terms is oper-
ated by one of its sides, the other is excluded not only internally but 
also externally, for it is excluded from the very form of the exclusion. In 
this situation, which has been described here, the whole is to be con-
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ceived as an unmediated, tensionless polarity without field; and for this, 
the multistable figure offers a kind of placeholder.
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